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INTRODUCTION
In recent years, increasing attention has been given to the impact
of technical measures, and in particular sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS)
regulations and standards, on trade in agricultural and food products.  With
the progressive dismantling of formal barriers to trade through interna-
tional trade negotiations at both the bilateral and multilateral levels, ana-
lysts have focused in on other measures that have the potential to impede
trade.  Simultaneously, our understanding of the manner in which techni-
cal measures can influence trade has improved.
The range and diversity of SPS and other technical measures ap-
plied to agricultural and food products are typically large and increasing
over time.  For example, Figure 1 reports the numbers of notifications of
new SPS measures by Canada, Mexico and Canada under the WTO SPS
Agreement over the period 1995-2001.  The number of annual notifica-
tions for the United States has increased from less than 50 in the each of
the first three years of the Agreement to more than 150 for the most recent
two years.  In total more than 500 notifications have been registered by the
United States, while Mexico has registered less than 200 and Canada only133
slightly over 100.  Simultaneously, the qualitative nature of these mea-
sures is changing reflecting advances in scientific understanding of risk
and risk analysis, changes in priorities, the evolution of international stan-
dards, and changes in agricultural (bio)technology.  Consequently, the task
of analysing the impact of a SPS measures on trade in agricultural and
food products has become even more problematic and resource intensive.
SPS MEASURES AS TECHNICAL BARRIERS TO TRADE
Non-tariff trade barriers (NTBs) are defined by Hillman (1991) as
all restrictions, other than traditional tariffs, which distort international trade.
Such measures directly impede the importation of products and, because
they do not apply in an equivalent manner to domestic production, dis-
criminate against imports (Beghin and Bureau, 2001).  In some cases such
measures are explicitly trade-related, for example import prohibitions and
quantitative restrictions, aimed at restricting imports.  In others, they do
not explicitly aim to provide trade protection, but can act to restrict trade
flows, for example technical barriers to trade (TBTs).
Figure 1: Cumulative Notifications of SPS Measures to the WTO,
1995-2001.





















Source:  World Trade Organization.
Henson and Bredahl134 Keeping the Borders Open
Roberts and DeKremer (1997, p. 1) define TBTs as:
Standards governing the sale of products into national
markets, which have as their prima facie objective the cor-
rection of market inefficiencies stemming from externalities
associated with the production, distribution and consump-
tion of these products.
These measures aim to prevent the entry into national markets of
products that fail to meet pre-specified standards.  In this context, ‘stan-
dards’ are technical specifications relating to characteristics of products or
to the manner in which they are produced and processed.  Equivalent mea-
sures may or may not be applied to domestic products, depending on their
relative characteristics and the risks that pre-specified standards would be
violated.
A variety of policy instruments can be employed by governments
to correct (real or perceived) market failures.  Our interest here is in those
measures that are applied to imports (Table 1).  Three broad categories of
measures are applied (Roberts et al., 1999).  First, import bans prohibit the
entry of a product entirely, from a particular country/region, or at a spe-
cific time of the year.  These are most widely applied to products that pose
a great risk to human, plant or animal health and where alternative meth-
ods of control are technically or economically infeasible. Second, techni-
cal specifications define requirements that products must satisfy in order
to be permitted entry.  These can encompass the characteristics of the product
itself, the process by which it is produced and the manner in which it is
packaged.  Predefined methods of conformity assessment are specified to
determine whether the product is in compliance and can be permitted to
Table 1: Classification of Technical Barriers to Trade.
    Import Bans    Technical Specifications    Information
 Requirements
Total Partial  Process    Product Packaging      Labelling     Controls on
 Ban  Ban Standards  Standards Standards    Requirements     Voluntary
Claims
Source: Roberts et al. (1999).135
enter.  Third, information measures require certain information to be dis-
closed on the product label and/or control the claims that can be made
about the characteristics of the product.
Technical barriers to trade are applied to address a wide range of
societal interests, notably protecting the economic interests of suppliers
(agricultural producers, food processors etc.), the health and economic
interests of food consumers, and the natural environment (Table 2) (Rob-
erts et al., 1999).  For each of these objectives a distinction can be made
between measures associated with risks to human, plant or animal health
or the environment, and measures associated with other societal objec-
tives, for example protecting the economic interests of consumers.  The
focus of this paper is on this first set of measures, which are commonly
referred to as SPS measures.
Technical measures differ in the extent to which they discriminate
between domestic and imported products.  Non-discriminatory measures
are applied equally to domestic and imported products, although differ-
ences may remain in the manner in which conformity assessment is under-
taken.1  Discriminatory measures apply additional and/or qualitatively dif-
ferent requirements to imported products.  Furthermore, measures can be
applied to all imports regardless of source or discriminate between indi-
vidual exporting countries.  The extent to which technical measures dis-
criminate between products according to source is an important factor in-
Table 2: Classification of Technical Barriers to Trade by Objective.
Societal Interests Risk-Reducing Measures Non Risk-Reducing Measures
Suppliers Protection of commercial Compatibility of products
  animal/plant health
Consumers Food safety Quality characteristics
Natural Environment Protection of natural Environmental conservation
  environment from harmful
  non-indigenous species
Source: Roberts et al. (1999).
____________________
1  Imported products may be subject to border inspection, whereas no comparable
system of inspection is applied to domestic products.
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fluencing the impact on trade, both in terms of total trade flows and flows
between particular countries.
Whereas much of the concern about the impact of technical mea-
sures on trade has concentrated on mandatory government requirements,
there is growing awareness that voluntary standards can also impede trade.
First, compliance with established voluntary standards may be essential
because consumers require compatibility with complementary products or
services (for example plastic containers and microwave ovens).  Second,
voluntary standards may be closely related to consumer preferences (for
example safety marks that are seen by consumers as an essential guarantee
of minimum product quality). Third, voluntary standards may be consid-
ered crucial for compliance with mandatory standards (for example ISO
9000 as a means to satisfy the requirements of food safety regulations).  If
such standards are so widely applied that they become de facto manda-
tory, there may in practice be little choice but for foreign suppliers to com-
ply.
In addition to the standards associated with technical barriers to
trade, the methods applied to assess conformity can also discriminate be-
tween domestic suppliers and exporters, often explicitly by applying addi-
tional or different methods of conformity assessment to imports.  For ex-
ample, imports are frequently subject to inspection at the border, while
domestic products are not subject to an equivalent process of conformity
assessment prior to sale.
Some analysts dispute the above definition of TBTs.  Rather they
consider the term ‘barrier’ should be not be applied to measures whose
principle objective is to correct market inefficiencies, but happen to have
an incidental impact on trade (Beghin and Bureau, 2001).  For example,
Baldwin (1970) considers that national technical measures (NTMs) having
an overall positive welfare effect should not be classified as NTBs.  Other
analysts define NTBs by reference to the difference between an existing
measure and the measure that would be applied if all supplies were from
domestic sources (for example Maskus et al., 2001).137
In the case of SPS measures specifically, the use of the term ‘bar-
rier’ may be guided by the rules of the SPS Agreements.  Both Agreements
define criteria to assess whether a technical measure is ‘justified.’  This is
assessed according to the specific nature of the measure, its objectives and
the potential impact on trade.  This is essentially a scientific – does the
measure address a real risk to human, animal or plant health of the envi-
ronment? – and an economic – does the measure distort trade to the mini-
mum extent possible? – issue.
SPS AND OTHER TECHNICAL MEASURES AND TRADE WITHIN
NAFTA
The foregoing discussion suggests that agricultural and food prod-
ucts are typically subject to a wide range and diversity of SPS and other
technical measures that have the potential to impede trade.  This section
now explores the incidence of these measures in Canada, Mexico and the
United States.  In so doing, the aim is to highlight the extent to which
agricultural and food products are subject to SPS and other technical mea-
sures in intra-NAFTA trade.  This analysis is based on data derived from
the UNCTAD database, which includes an inventory of non-tariff mea-
sures, including technical measures, applied to agricultural and food prod-
ucts at the eight-digit level.
The most widely applied measures by Mexico are labelling require-
ments (22.7%), testing, inspection and quarantine requirements to protect
plant health (16.5%), and product characteristic requirements for plant health
protection (12.3%).  Collectively, these account for over 50 percent of the
measures applied.  The products to which technical measures are most
widely applied are live animals, fruit, vegetable and nut preparations, oil-
seeds, dairy products, eggs and honey, and meat and edible meat offal.
Relatively few technical measures are applied to other vegetable products,
cocoa and cocoa preparations, and gums, resins etc.
In Canada, the most frequently applied technical measures are au-
thorization for plant health, human health and animal health protection,
and marking and product characteristic requirements for human health
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protection.  The products to which measures are most widely applied are
edible vegetables, roots and tubers, meat and edible meat offal, edible
fruits and nuts, fish, crustaceans, molluscs etc, and dairy products, eggs
and honey.
The most frequently applied measures by the United States are
testing, inspection or quarantine requirements to protect human, and health
and product characteristic requirements for human health protection.  Col-
lectively, these account for around 70 percent of the measures applied.
The incidence of technical measures is highest in the case of dairy prod-
ucts, eggs and honey, fruit, vegetable and nut preparations, and fish crus-
taceans, molluscs etc.
Technical measures are more likely to impede trade, everything
else being equal, where multiple measures are applied simultaneously to a
single commodity.  In Canada, multiple technical measures are applied to
around 22 percent of tariff lines.  This contrasts to Mexico and the United
States, where the proportion of tariff lines to which more than one techni-
cal measure is applied is 79 percent and 75 percent respectively.
While the data presented above indicates the number and types of
technical measures applied in the NAFTA countries, it may be of little use
in itself in assessing the importance of such measures to trade.  However,
two measures can be calculated that provide some indication of the pro-
portion of trade subject to technical measures.  The Trade Coverage Ratio
(TCR) estimates the percentage of trade subject to NTMs, in total or of a
particular type, for an exporting country.  An alternative measure that over-
comes the problem of endogeneity of the import value weights is the fre-
quency index (FI).  The FI does not reflect the relative weight of the af-
fected products and, as a consequence, does not give any indication of the139
importance of measures to an exporter overall, or between export items.
TCR and FI are defined in a footnote below.2
While frequency-based approaches provide some indication of the
incidence of SPS and other technical measures, in practice there may be
little relationship between frequency of application and the magnitude of
any associated trade effects.  Rather, the exact nature of the measure ap-
plied is probably of greater importance.  Thus, the data presented below
may indicate where SPS measures are applied and could be a problem, but
they do not indicate actual barriers to trade.
____________________
2  The Trade Coverage Ratio (TCR) (Cjt) estimates the percentage of trade subject to
NTMs, in total or of a particular type, for an exporting country (j) at a particular level
of product aggregation:
where:
Di is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if a technical measure is
applied and zero otherwise;
Vi is the value of imports of tariff line I;
t is the year of measurement of the technical measure; and
T is the year of the import weights.
An alternative measures that overcome the problem of endogeneity of the import
value weights is the frequency index (FI) (Fjt):
where:
Di is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if a technical measure is
applied and zero otherwise;
Mi is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if there are imports from
the exporting country j and zero otherwise; and
T is the year of measurement of the technical measure.
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Table 3 reports the TCR and FI for bilateral exports of agricultural
and food products between Mexico, Canada and the United States.  Across
all three markets, the majority of commodities have an estimated TCR and
FI of 100 percent, indicating that all trade is subject to technical measures.
Conversely, there are commodities for which the TCR and FI have values
of zero.  There are also significant differences in the estimated TCR and FI
between bilateral trade flows, reflecting variation in the structure of trade
and the incidence of technical measures.
The relative values of the TCR and FI provide information on the
distribution of technical measures versus the value of trade flows.  For
example, in the case of sugar and sugar confectionery exports to the United
States the TCR has a value of 70 percent, while the FI has a value of only
18 percent.  This indicates that, while the majority of tariff lines where
trade occurred were free of technical measures, the majority of trade oc-
curred along tariff lines to which technical measures were applied.
While the TCR and FI provide some indication of the proportion of
trade subject to technical measures, they do not provide any indication of
the extent to which such measures actually impede trade.  To assess the
extent to which technical measures are actually TBTs requires further analy-
sis.  In many instances this is undertaken on a case-by-case basis, as in the
case of U.S. phytosanitary restrictions on Mexican exports of avocados
(see Box 1).
However, some information can be gleaned from other published
data, for example on U.S. border detentions.  The U.S. Food and Drugs
Administration (FDA) routinely publish data on consignments of agricul-
tural and food products that are detained at the U.S. border.  These data
only cover products and controls for which the FDA is responsible (and
thus most meat and meat products are excluded) and do not provide infor-
mation on the eventual fate of detained consignments – whether they are
eventually permitted to enter, are re-exported, or destroyed.
Tables 4 and 5 detail the number of detained consignments from
Mexico and Canada in 2001.  In the case of Mexico, the most frequently141
From Mexico to  From Canada to  From US to 


























































1  Live animals  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100 
2  Meat and edible 
meat offal  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  98 
3  Fish, crustaceans, 
mollusks   100  100  100  100  100  100  100  96  100  100  100  100 
4  Dairy products, 
eggs and honey  100  100  100  100  100  100 












5  Other products of 
animal origin  100  100  100  100 
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6  Live plants, flowers 
etc.  100  100  100  100 
100   100      
100  
  
100   100  100  100  100 
7  Edible vegetables, 
roots and tubers  100  100  100  100  100  60  100  100  100  100  96  83 
8  Edible fruits and 
nuts  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  95 
9  Coffee, tea and 
spices  100  100  -  -  100  100  4  21  100  100  100  100 
10  Cereals  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100 
11  Products of the 
milling industries 
(starch, gluten etc.)  100  100  -  0  100  100  -  -  100  100  100  100 
12  Oilseeds  100  100  78  65  100  100  54  54  100  100  100  100 
13  Gums, resins etc.  100  100  -  -  100  100  -  -  100  100  41  80 
14  Other vegetable 
products  100  100  -  -  -  -  -  -  100  100  65  75 
15  Animal and 
vegetable oils and 
fats  -  -  3  5  23  67  2  13  -  -  79  57 
16  Preparations of 
meat and fish  -  -  100  100  100  100  100  100  -  -  100  100 
17  Sugar and sugar 
confectionery  -  -  70  18  74  67  56  18  -  -  82  67 
18  Cocoa and cocoa 
preparations  -  -  -  -  100  100  -  -  -  -  100  100 
19  Cereal preparations  -  -  100  100  100  100  100  100  -  -  100  100 
20  Fruit, vegetable and 
nut preparations  -  -  100  100  100  100  100  100  -  -  100  100 
21  Other preparations  -  -  100  100  79  88  100  100  -  -  100  94 
22  Beverages, spirits 
and vinegar  -  -  94  80  100  100  67  78  -  -  100  100 
23  Residues and waste 
from food industry  -  -  -  -  99  80  -  -  -  -  80  66 
24  Tobacco and 
manufactured 
tobacco substitutes  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  100  100 
 
Table 3: Frequency Measures (Percent) of Technical Measures on
Bilateral Trade in Food and Food Products.
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Box 1: Phytosanitary Controls on Mexican Exports of Avocados to the
United States.
There has been a longstanding, and high profile dispute over U.S. phytosanitary
controls on imports of avocados from Mexico.  In 1914, U.S. officials identified
avocado seed weevil in Mexican avocados and instituted an import ban.  After
repeatedly rebuffing Mexican requests for import permission for almost 80 years, in
July 1993, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) permitted Hass
avocados grown in Michoacan to be imported into Alaska under certain conditions.
Growers and packers in Michoacan adopted improved grove management tech-
niques, packing practices and shipping practices in order to export their avocados
(Roberts and Orden, 1997, Bredahl 2001).
In 1994, Mexico requested extended entry for Hass avocados to the North East-
ern States. On February 5 1997, APHIS published its final rule allowing Mexican
Hass avocados to enter 19 states and the District of Columbia.
Imports are permitted from the state of Michoacan under certain conditions.
The approval is based on scientific risk assessments that include a series of inter-
related restrictions termed a ‘systems approach’. Under the systems approach, com-
mercial shipments of fresh Hass avocados grown in approved orchards in Michoacan
may be imported into 19 North Eastern states and the District of Columbia during
the period November to February.  The systems approach safeguards are designed to
progressively reduce risk to an insignificant level. The safeguards make up what is
termed a ‘fail-safe’ system, which means that if one of the mitigating measures should
fail, there are others in place to ensure that the risk is managed and reduced. It is a
system of safeguards that occur consecutively in stages. The nine mitigating mea-
sures consist of: 1) natural host plant resistance to fruit flies; 2) field surveys; 3) pest
trap and bait measures in the orchards; 4) field sanitation measures; 5) post-harvest
safeguards; 6) winter shipping; 7) packinghouse instructions; 8) port-of-arrival in-
spections; 9) limited US distribution.  All stages are overseen and supervised by
APHIS.  Should pests in the avocados be detected at any stage in the system, avo-
cado imports may be suspended from affected areas.
Since the lifting of the restrictions, Mexican exports of avocados to the United
States have increased significantly.  In 1991, Mexican exports of avocadoes to the
United States were negligible at 367 tonnes, accounting for only 2 percent of total
imports.  However, by 2000, exports had increased to 14,479 tonnes, accounting for
17 percent of total imports.
In September 1999, Mexico requested that the United States extend both the
seasonal period and geographical region to which avocados can be exported from
Mexico.  In November 2001, APHIS issued a new rule, extending the number of
states to which avocados can be exported to 31 and extending the permitted entry
period to six months from October 15 to April 15.143
detained commodities were processed fruit and fresh vegetables.  In the
case of Canada, meat products and fish were most frequently detained.
The predominant reasons for detention were pesticide residues, microbio-
logical contamination, filth and non-permitted additives in the case of
Mexico, and labelling and microbiological contamination in the case of
Canada.
Table  4: United States Border Detentions of Agricultural and Food
Products by Product, 2001.
Product     Mexico   Canada
Fresh vegetables 716 12
Processed vegetables 252 27
Fresh fruit 152 4
Processed fruit 1,188 5
Fish 156 51
Beverages 336 16
Baked goods 180 15
Confectionery 216 30
Spices/seasoning 22 2
Meat products 24 123
Dairy products 0 9
Other 15 24
TOTAL 3,257 318
Source:   Analysis of FDA data
Table  5: United States Border Detentions of Agricultural and Food
Products by Reason, 2001.
Product     Mexico   Canada
Microbiological contamination 1,044 132
Physical Contamination 624 34
Labelling 312 105
Pesticide residues 1,140 0
Non-permitted additives 576 15
Non-registration 165 66
Other 48 4
Source:   Analysis of FDA data
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RULES GOVERNING APPLICATION OF SPS MEASURES IN NAFTA
As discussed above, SPS measures are laws, regulations or proce-
dures aimed at the protection of human, animal and plant health.  More
specifically, the SPS Agreement defines SPS measures as any measure ap-
plied:
• to protect animal or plant life or health within the territory of the
member from risks arising from the entry, establishment or spread
of pests, diseases, disease-carrying organisms or disease-caus-
ing organisms;
• to protect human or animal life within the territory of the mem-
ber from risks arising from additives, contaminants, toxins or
disease-causing organisms in foods, beverages, or feedstuffs;
• to protect human life or health within the territory of the member
from risks arising from diseases carried by animals, plants or
products thereof, or from the entry, establishment or spread of
pests; and
• to prevent or limit other damage within the territory of the mem-
ber from the entry, establishment of spread of pests.
Chapter 7 of the NAFTA Agreement lays down rules for the appli-
cation of SPS measures.  The aim of the Agreement is to:
…establish a framework of rules and disciplines to guide
the development, adoption and enforcement of sanitary and
phytosanitary measures…and applies to any measure of a
Party that may, directly or indirectly, affect trade between
Parties.  To a large extent the provisions of the Agreement
are modelled on the text of the WTO SPS Agreement, al-
though this was still evolving at the time the NAFTA Agree-
ment was signed.  It also forms the basis of the text relating
to SPS measures in the draft Agreement of the Free Trade
Area of the Americas (FTAA).
NAFTA permits the Parties to adopt, maintain or apply any SPS
measures necessary for the protection of human, animal or plant life or145
health ion its territory, including measures more stringent that international
standards, guidelines or recommendations.  Furthermore, in protecting
human, animal or plant life of health, Parties are able to establish their own
‘appropriate level of protection.’  Notwithstanding the above, the Agree-
ment requires that SPS measures are based on scientific principles, are not
maintained where there is no longer a scientific basis, and are based on a
risk assessment, as appropriate under the circumstances.  Further, Parties
must not adopt measures, or arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminate be-
tween their goods and like goods of any other country where identical or
similar conditions prevail.
The NAFTA Agreement promotes the harmonization of SPS mea-
sures by requiring Parties to base their SPS measures on relevant interna-
tional standards, guidelines and recommendations with the objective of
ensuring such measures are, at the least, equivalent to those of other Par-
ties.  Measures that conform to international standards, guidelines and rec-
ommendations are considered justified from a scientific perspective.  It
also promotes the mutual recognition of SPS measures by requiring Parties
to pursue equivalence of their respective measures to the greatest extent
practicable.  This requires that, through use of risk assessment methodolo-
gies, the measures adopted by an exporting country are demonstrated to
provide the ‘level of maintained by an importing country.
The Agreement also recognises the concept of regionalization,
whereby, while an exporting country may not be free of a pest or disease,
specific territories within that country may be pest- or disease-free, or have
a low prevalence.  It requires that Parties recognise pest- or disease-free
areas and apply SPS measures accordingly.
Provisions are made for the exchange of information on SPS mea-
sures between Parties.  As a general rule, Parties are required to notify other
Parties and provide a full text of proposed measures at least 60 days prior
to the adoption of modification of the measure.  Further, each Party is
required to establish an Enquiry Point, as a single point of contact for
questions and requests for documentation relating to SPS measures pro-
posed, adopted or maintained.
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The Agreement establishes a Committee on Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Measures, comprising representatives from each party with
responsibility for SPS matters.  The Committee is responsible for facilitat-
ing:
• the enhancement of food safety and SPS conditions in the territo-
ries of the parties;
• activities of the parties pursuant to international standard (Article
713) and equivalence
   (Article 714);
• technical co-operation; and
• consultation on bilateral issues.
An SPS issue can be raised by any party and is then sent to the Committee
for consideration.  To date, the Committee has had ten meetings.
A series of bilateral or trilateral Technical Working Groups (TWG)
has also been established, which consider subject-specific matters and aim
to develop proposals relating to, for example, harmonization and equiva-
lence.  Currently, TWG operate in the areas of:
• Animal health (bilateral);3
• Dairy, fruits, vegetables and processed foods (United States-
Canada);
• Fish and fishery product inspection (trilateral);
• Food additives and contaminants (trilateral);
• Labelling, packaging and standards (trilateral);
• Meat, poultry and egg inspection (trilateral);
• Pesticides (trilateral); and
• Plant health, seeds and fertilizer (bilateral).4
As well as the NAFTA institutions, arrangements exist bilaterally
through which SPS issues are raised and addressed.  For example, the
Agriculture Working Group of the U.S.-Mexico Binational Commission
has provided a forum through which various initiatives have been devel-
____________________
3  North American Animal Health Committee provides a trilateral forum.
4  North American Plant Protection Organisation provides  a trilateral forum.147
oped for co-operation on SPS issues.  For example, in 1998 a co-operative
agreement was established between Mexico and the United States aimed at
enhancing activities of mutual interest relating to the safety of foods for
human consumption.  More generally, the Agriculture Working Group has
provided a forum through which concerns relating to SPS measures are
addressed.  For example, the group has been instrumental in the accep-
tance of the Mexican state of Yucatan as an area of low risk for classical
swine fever by the United States, and thus providing market access for
Yucatan pork and pork products.
Table 6 provides a summary of the major issues raised at the eight
meetings of the NAFTA SPS Committee over the period 1994-99.  The
Table 6: Summary of Issues Raised at NAFTA SPS Committee, 1994-1999.
Product    Export Market   Type of Measure
 Mexico





Candies US Food safety
Horticultural products US Food Safety
Cattle US Food safety
Milk products US Food safety
Poultry US Food safety
Livestock US Animal disease
Meat US Animal disease
Pork US/Canada Animal disease
Poultry US/Canada Animal disease
                                             United States
Cherries Mexico Phytosanitary
Potato seeds & tubers Mexico Phytosanitary
Citrus fruit Mexico Phytosanitary
Sawn wood & plywood Mexico Phytosanitary
Processed food products Mexico Food safety
 Canada
Potato seed Mexico Phytosanitary
Source:  Based on published minutes of NAFTA SPS Committee.
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majority of issues concern controls relating to plant or animal diseases and
acceptance of pest or disease-free status.  These issues have been most
frequently raised in the context of trade between Mexico and the United
States.  The main food safety issues raised through the Committee have
been associated with the recognition of inspection or approval systems.
OVERCOMING THE TRADE EFFECTS OF SPS MEASURES
A variety of rapprochement efforts can be made to overcome the
trade effects of incompatibilities between standards across global markets.
This section explores the main forms of rapprochement mechanisms in
general and then assesses the extent to which these have been employed
within NAFTA in an attempt to overcome the trade effects of SPS mea-
sures.
Figure 2 illustrates a simple scenario in which four trading partners
apply a standard that differs quantitatively between ‘high’ and ‘low’ levels
(Jacobs, 1994; Hooker and Caswell, 1996; 1999).  A good example is
maximum residue levels (MRLs) for pesticides in agricultural and food
products.  The width of the arrows in Figure 2 depicts the magnitude of
trade flows that will normally take place between countries that apply a
‘high’ (CH
1 and C H
2) and ‘low’ (CL
3 and C L
4) standard.
Three forms of rapprochement can be used to address incompat-
ibilities in the standard employed by individual trading partners: 1) co-
ordination; 2) mutual recognition; and c) harmonization.  Co-ordination is
the weakest form of rapprochement, whereby countries aim to narrow dif-
ferences between standards, for example through the application of volun-
tary international codes of practice.  While such efforts may facilitate trade
between countries that co-ordinate their requirements at a similar level,
they do not overcome the problems faced by countries adopting relatively
low standards (for example developing countries) when exporting to coun-
tries with relatively high standards (for example high-income countries).
Thus, co-ordination may enable trade to proceed more easily from high to
low standard countries, but trade in the opposite direction will remain im-
peded.149
Figure 2: Trade Effects of Rapprochement of Standards.
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Source:  Hooker and Caswell (1999). 
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It is important to note that low standard countries may participate
in co-ordination efforts, despite the fact that barriers to trade with high
standard countries remain unaffected.  For example, such an approach can
facilitate trade between low standard countries and may be part of efforts
to enhance domestic consumer protection.  It may also be part of longer-
term efforts to enhance regulatory capacity.
Mutual recognition is a stronger form of rapprochement.  This ap-
proach is based on a recognition that technical requirements and/or con-
formity assessment procedures that differ can result in the same level of
protection.  Under mutual recognition, therefore, while countries may ap-
ply different technical standards, these measures are regarded as ‘equiva-
lent.’  In this case, the dominant direction of trade is from low to high
standard countries, presuming that lower standards are associated with lower
costs of compliance.  The SPS Committee within the WTO has recently
established guidelines aimed at facilitating dialogue between Members re-
garding the equivalency of SPS measures (WTO, 2001).
An important factor determining the willingness of trading part-
ners to engage in rapprochement  efforts, and the likely success of the
alternative mechanisms outlined above, is the state of SPS capacity, both
in absolute terms and the relative position of the parties.  Bolaños et al.
(2001) report the results of an analysis of SPS capacity in the countries of
the Americas, based on data collected over a three-year period.  This analysis
employs an analytical framework that defines SPS capacity in terms of
three frameworks.  These frameworks are identified using cluster analysis
of variables corresponding to key elements of the SPS system:
• Institutional framework: Mechanisms through which national
SPS interests are represented and defended, agreements imple-
mented, and commitments acquired at the international level ful-
filled.
• Technological framework: Systems of SPS controls through
which SPS problems are identified, controls undertaken and per-
formance monitored.151
• Regulatory framework: Systems of legislation relating to SPS
issues and the mechanisms through which these are brought into
compliance with international commitments.
Figure 3 presents the results of the assessment of SPS capacity for
the United States, Canada and Mexico.  All three countries have relatively
well-developed capacity with respect to all frameworks, in particular the
regulatory framework.  However, the level of capacity in Mexico is judged
to be less well developed than in Canada and the United States, particu-
larly in the case of the institutional and technological frameworks.  This
suggests there may be the greatest opportunities, and indeed willingness,
to undertake rapprochement efforts bilaterally on the part of Canada and
the United States.  However, rapprochement efforts are likely to be more
problematic between Canada/United States and Mexico It also highlights
the need for efforts to enhance SPS capacity in Mexico, in which both
Canada and the United States can play a part.
It is noteworthy, that in Canada, Mexico and the United States,
institutional capacity is least well developed.  This suggests that there may
be common weaknesses in institutions responsible for SPS matters at both
Figure 3: SPS Capacity in the United States, Canada and
Mexico.








Canada Mexico United States
Source:  Perez (2001).
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Table 7: Examples of Rapprochement Efforts through the NAFTA SPS
Committee and Technical Working Groups.
       Co-ordination Mutual Recognition Harmonisation
Source:  Reports of NAFTA SPS Committee.
FDA/CFIA Action Plan on
Food Safety




















































the national and international levels.  Indeed, the results reported by Bolaños
et al. (2001) suggest that institutional capacity is relatively weak through-
out the Americas.
The incidence data presented in Section 3 suggest that a large number
of SPS and other technical measures are applied to agricultural and food
products in Canada, Mexico and the United States.  Further, many com-
modities are subject simultaneously to a number of measures.  These mea-
sures differ widely, both qualitatively and quantitatively, and even subtle
differences can produce distinct outcomes in terms of trade.  Thus, in or-
der for rapprochement efforts to have a noticeable impact, measures must
be identified that have a significant trade effect and which are amenable to
negotiation on a bilateral or trilateral basis.  In many cases, such efforts
require a great deal of time and effort on the part of the negotiating parties,153
particularly in the case of harmonisation and mutual recognition, and such
inputs need to produce a demonstrable outcome to policy makers.
Table 7 provides examples of rapprochement efforts through the
NAFTA SPS Committee and Technical Working Groups.  It is evident that
rapprochement has been undertaken at all three levels – co-ordination,
mutual recognition and harmonisation.  Further, these efforts have cov-
ered a wide range of issues associated with SPS controls, including inspec-
tion and certification systems, testing methods, laboratories and data require-
ments, labelling requirements, and food additives and pesticide policies.  Al-
though the United States and Canada appear to have been most active, all
three parties to the NAFTA Agreement have been involved in these efforts.
There is a long history of trading partners negotiating, both bilater-
ally and multilaterally, but reductions in traditional barriers to trade, for
example tariffs and quotas, substantive negotiations relating to SPS and
other technical measures are a relatively new phenomenon.  This lack of
experience clearly influences the manner in which such negotiations have
been pursued to date, but the nature of SPS measures and the administra-
tive structures with which they are associated are quite different to those
related to traditional barriers to trade (Kerr, 1997):
• In the case of tariffs and other direct forms of trade protection,
the magnitude of the measure is normally directly measured and
any changes over time can be observed and monitored.  SPS and
other technical measures differ according to a wide range of quali-
tative and quantitative factors and, consequently, are not as ame-
nable to such measurements.  Thus, the costs and time taken to
gather information to enable the consequences of alternative
courses of action are likely to be considerable.
• Distinct institutions have developed with direct responsibility for
international trade negotiations.  In the United States, for example,
the Office of the US Trade Representative (USTR) is the single
institution responsible for such matters.  In the case of SPS mea-
sures, however, a multitude of agencies may be involved.  In the
United States, for example, these include the Food and Drugs
Administration (FDA), Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS),
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Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) etc.  The
responsibilities of these agencies are not focused on international
trade relations.  Indeed, this may be a relatively minor element of
their day-to-day activities.
• Many agencies responsible for SPS matters lack expertise in na-
tional and international trade law.  While trade experts may be-
come involved in negotiations relating to SPS measures in an
attempt to bridge this gap, these individuals typically lack exper-
tise in SPS matters.  Thus, international negotiations are likely to
be mirrored by negotiations at the national level between policy
makers responsible for trade and SPS-related matters.
Measures such as tariffs and quotas have trade protection as their
direct objective, but SPS measures are not explicitly trade-related.  Thus,
negotiations relating to SPS measures involves trade-offs between, for ex-
ample, trade-related objectives, consumer protection, protection of the eco-
nomic interests of agriculture and the food processing sectors, protection
of the environment etc.  Thus, negotiations are likely to be protracted and
involve processes of consultation, negotiation and compromise.
These differences suggest it might be reasonable to expect that
negotiations relating to SPS matters to be more complex and protracted
than those associated with traditional barriers to trade.  In turn, this sug-
gests that the resource costs for the negotiating parties will be greater.  In-
deed, history to date suggests that negotiations regarding rapprochement
efforts, in particular relating to equivalency and harmonisation, take con-
siderable periods of time.  Such negotiations involve not only agreement
and compromise over scientific issues, but also the development of trust
and confidence between the negotiating parties.  In view of the resource
costs of such negotiations, the parties must have a reasonable expectation
that an agreement can be reached before they will be willing to initiate
such a process.
We turn now to some examples of SPS issues affecting trade within
the NAFTA countries.  We also include some examples that have surfaced
in the FTAA negotiations.  This information was gathered by an informal155
telephone survey of trade associations and government officials.  As such,
it is neither a comprehensive inventory nor a balanced survey, as we know
more people in Canada and the United States than we know in Mexico or
FTAA countries.  Before proceeding with a discussion of our findings, an
important factor affecting the application of SPS measures as trade barriers
has been the discovery of antidumping actions as an effective and legal
way to protect domestic producers.  Once the purview of the United States,
it is now the instrument of choice in Mexico and, unless constrained by the
Doha Round of WTO negotiations, will become a universal tool to protect
domestic producers from import competition.
As Table 8 indicates, contentious SPS issues often deal with minute
details of administrative rulings and of SPS measures.  Seemingly innocu-
ous decisions such as where inspections are implemented can have impor-
tant impacts on trade flows and the incidence of costs.  But, resolution of
some of the issues calls for the adoption of broad concepts that have more
to do with incidence of costs than they do with safeguarding animal, plant
or human health.  None receives more attention than the framework to
regulate the safety of imported meat and meat products.  The two polar
cases are the ‘system approach’ where nations approve the food safety
system of the other country and the case-by-case approach that potentially
requires every plant in every country to be inspected by representatives of
food safety agencies of every trading partner.  In the first case the cost is
borne by governments, and in the second, they are borne by the owners of
slaughterhouses and meat processing plants.
But the seeming logic of negotiating approval of national food
safety systems may not withstand public scrutiny.  The Washington Post,
in its February 25th issue, critically noted: “in protecting nearly 4 billion
pounds of meat imported each year, the USDA increasingly relies on for-
eign governments – including ones that have repeatedly failed to get the
job done.”  (Warrick) The article goes on to reference a report by USDA
Inspector General Roger C. Viadero: “He concluded that the USDA was
failing to enforce its own rules, extending a welcome to imports and coun-
tries that had not been able or willing to meet U.S. standards.  Viadero
found that 19 out of 36 U.S. trading partners had exported meat to the
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Importer/Exporter  Description and Comments 
Red Meats: 
Mexico/US 
Mexico recently changed the location of inspection of meat imports from 
the United States.  Under the previous system, Mexican inspectors on 
the US side of the border inspected meat.  Now the loads are inspected 
in Mexico.  The loads will carry an FSIS export inspection certificate.  
Several loads, either whole or partial, have been rejected in Mexico, 
creating a complex problem for disposal of the meat.  It must be 
reexported back to the United States or destroyed in Mexico. 
Live Feeder Cattle: 
Canada/US 
Canada restricts the import of feeder cattle from the United States to the 
period October 1 to March 31.  The restriction is to prevent the import 
and spread of antiplasmosis and blue tongue.  Blood-sucking insects 
that are not, obviously, present after a killing frost, spread the diseases.  
The United States argues that climatic conditions will prevent the import 
and spread of the disease regardless of the season. 
Beef Shelf life 
restrictions: 
Mexico/US 
As part of the resolution of the antidumping case, Mexico does not allow 
the import of beef beyond 30 days from slaughter.  Part of the 
rationalization was that US packers were dumping overage beef into the 




US does not allow the importation of intact heifers from Mexico and has 
refused to consider imports on a regional basis.  At issue is brucellosis 
and tuberculosis.  Mexicans point out that the tests for these diseases 
are very expensive, and so the restriction is actually a prohibition. 
Apples: Mexico/US  Mexico requires preshipment inspection and approval, by Mexican 
inspectors, of exports of apples to Mexico.  The cost is paid by US 
packers and exporters.  They felt that a preclearance program operated 
by APHIS should be sufficient, and would be a good deal less costly. 
Red Meats: 
Mexico/US 
The United States regulatory agencies have not been able to agree with 
their Mexican counterparts to a ‘systems approval’ of the slaughter and 
meat processing industry in Mexico.  Representatives of the US red 
meat industry insist on that as the only option.  If a plant-by-plant 
inspection system is imposed, the cost shifts from governments to plant 
owners.  This tends to favour large firms with deep pockets and 
disadvantage small firms.  If adopted widely it significantly increases 
costs as some US firms export to as many as 40 or 50 countries, each of 
which might require a plant inspection. 
Potatoes: 
US/Canada 
See case study in Box 2. 
Karnal Bunt: 
Canada/US 
Canada agreed to program to approve US areas as being free of karnal 
bunt disease (of wheat) in three phases over a three-year period.  
Carried out the first two phases, but have never completed the third and 
so four states are (unfairly) under quarantine restrictions. 
Avocados: 
US/Mexico 
See case study in Box 1. 157
Box 2: Resolution of the United States Import Ban on Potatoes from
Prince Edward Island.
On October 24, 2000, the CFIA confirm the discovery of potato wart disease in a .4 hectare
portion of a 30 hectare field on Price Edward Island (PEI).  On October 31, the USDA imposed a
temporary emergency measure prohibiting the importation of seed and table stock potatoes from
PEI.  (Potato wart had previously been found only in Newfoundland and Labrador where a plant
quarantine has been in place since 1912.)
In early November, the US and Canada agreed to a ‘three tiered approach” to resolve the
trade impasse.  Stage 1:  PIE potatoes may not be exported to the US.  Exports of other potatoes
must be accompanied by a CFIA certificate of origin.  To prevent commingling of PEI potatoes
with other Canadian potatoes, movements off the Island must be in consumer bags of 20
pounds of less.  Stage 2:  Canadian officials must propose a system that “adequate mitigates the
risk of the potato wart.”  This proposal is to be reviewed by APHIS and a panel of experts,
including the representatives from the CFIA.  Stage 3:  Canada “will aim at establishing
regulated and non regulated areas, based on survey, inspection and investigation evidence. After
completion of this stage, USDA will consider suspension of the requirements of the systems
approach and allow shipment of tablestock from non regulated areas. Potatoes from areas
regulated for potato wart may not be exported to the U.S.”  (Sherman)
On April 30, 2001 the US reopened its border to PEI potatoes under the following
conditions (Baldacci):  “four risk zones have been established within PEI. Potatoes within each
zone will be subject to strict review and movement conditions. Zone one consists of the field
where potato wart was detected and a half mile buffer area around the field. Zone two includes
all fields that have shared farming equipment with the infected area. Zone three consists of the
fields surrounding and between zones one and two. Zone four is the remainder of PEI. USDA
officials have approved the following restrictions:
• Bulk importation of potatoes will remain suspended, as well as the importation of
seed potatoes. In addition, fresh tablestock potatoes from zone one and two cannot be
moved off PEI.
• The USDA will accept tablestock potatoes directly from zone four provided they are
washed and treated with sprout inhibitor. These potatoes are limited to boxes and
bags no larger than 50 pounds, and must be intensively inspected and certified by
Canadian agriculture officials. All surface shipments of zone four PEI potatoes
coming into the U.S. must enter in Houlton.
• Movement of PEI potatoes within Canada must also meet specific requirements.
Tablestock potatoes from zone three and four may move only if the soil has been
removed from the potatoes so that they meet Canada’s most stringent standards for
cleanliness. Additionally, the potatoes must be intensively inspected for potato wart
disease and are limited to boxes or bags of 50 pounds or less.
• Seed potatoes may move within Canada from zones three and four if seed certifica-
tion procedures and phytosanitary inspections at the point of shipment are followed
and conducted. Sorting line soil sampling and testing must also be performed before
seed potatoes can be shipped.
On August 1, 2002, agreement was reached on necessary conditions for free import of
new crop potatoes from PEI.  For three years, the CFIA must monitor and survey every field on
PEI according to an agreed protocol.  After three years, given that conditions favourable for the
emergence of the fungus, all fields on PEI should have been inspect satisfactorily.
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United States, even though their meat-sanitation programs fell short in key
areas, such as testing for chemical residues.”5  The article conceded: “the
inspector general found no evidence that the agency’s policies had al-
lowed unsanitary meat to enter the country.”   A representative of a con-
sumer group offers the opinion that the article clearly indicated the need
for country of origin labelling.  (Jaeger)
Private certification schemes, which are popular and widely used
in Europe, may be the logical way out of the dilemma for livestock slaugh-
ter and meat processing.  Certification to an independent food hygiene
standard (like the European Food Safety and Inspection System), that re-
quired third-party audits, would combine elements of a systems approach
and plant-by-plant approval.  An important consideration in this approach
would be the nature of product liability laws in importing countries.
Canadian potato imports because of the discovery of potato wart
fungus on Prince Edward Island provides a convenient case study to ex-
plore the resolution of a SPS disagreement under NAFTA rules and proce-
dures.  (See Box 2 for a brief summary of the case.)  The case does indicate
the transparency of the plant protection system, as Canada reported the
discovery of the fungus and so observed its obligations under the North
American Plant Protection Agreement.  The reaction of the United States to
the announcement, the ban on all potato imports from Prince Edward Is-
land, is difficult to rationalize.  Clearly, the Canadian Food Inspection
Agency took immediate action to prevent the spread of the fungus to nearby
fields and to other provinces in Canada.  (An anonymous source did indi-
cate that there was some concern on the US side about the competence of
provincial authorities, and of role that CFIA would play in isolating the
site.)  The dispute was ultimately resolved with the US placing stringent
requirements on the actions Canada must take to maintain isolation of the
fungus.
____________________
5  US meat packers complain that the import requirements of the European Union are
discriminatory because they require testing for the presence of (chemical) compounds
that are not used in the United States.  The only approved laboratory is located in
Canada so the tests are very expensive.159
One of the essential elements of the NAFTA and WTO SPS Agree-
ments is that of risk assessment.  One of the evolving areas of the interpre-
tation and application of these agreements is what constitutes an accept-
able risk assessment.  Quite clearly, the risk assessment carried out by the
United States must have allowed for a very, very small probability of intro-
duction of the potato wart fungus.  While the dispute was eventually re-
solved, it is not the high point of US implementation of the NAFTA SPS
Agreement.
IMPLICATIONS
It is evident from the foregoing discussion that agricultural and
food exports within NAFTA are subject to a range of SPS and other techni-
cal measures.  These measures differ in their form and objectives and many
products are simultaneously subject to multiple measures.  Consequently,
assessing the impact of SPS measures on trade is problematic.  While the
incidence data presented above provide some indication of where SPS
measures are likely to be more, or less, important, further analysis is re-
quired to identify the extent to which trade is actually impeded.  Such an
analysis inevitably has to be taken on a case-by-case basis and conse-
quently the costs, both in terms of time and resources, are typically large.
It is evident from the proceedings of the NAFTA SPS Committee
and other evidence, for example US border detention data, that SPS mea-
sures remain a major issue for agricultural and food product exporters.
Indeed, at least in part because of the success of NAFTA in reducing tradi-
tional barriers to trade, for example tariffs, the impact of SPS and other
technical measures on trade in agricultural and food products is coming to
the forefront of our attention.
NAFTA defines procedures through which disputes between
NAFTA members over SPS and other technical measures can be pursued.
To date, however, these formal dispute settlement procedures have been
mainly applied to conventional trade problems, for example tariffs and
anti-dumping.  Typically, disputes over SPS measures have been addressed
on a bilateral basis.  Such negotiations generally involve detailed and
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lengthy dialogues of both an economic and scientific nature and can take
long periods of time to resolve, as is illustrated by the case of avocado
exports from Mexico to the United States, and of potato exports from Canada
to the United States.
In many cases, SPS measures are applied for legitimate reasons, as
defined by the rules laid down for the application of SPS measures under
NAFTA and the Uruguay Round Agreements.  Thus, whilst such measures
may have a significant impact on trade, they may not be technical barriers
to trade, at least according to the strictest definition.  In such circumstances
trading partners must pursue rapprochement strategies in order to minimise
the trade effects of incompatibilities in SPS requirements.  Such strategies
can be costly and time consuming to pursue, particularly where there are
significant differences in SPS capacity and the need to establish trust and
confidence in the efficacy of controls between trading partners.  This could
be a major impediment to such efforts as NAFTA evolves into the FTAA
and encompasses countries with much lower levels of SPS capacity.
There are numerous examples of rapprochement efforts between
the NAFTA Members, including the entire range of strategies detailed in
Table 15.  The majority have been pursued on a bilateral basis, particularly
between Canada and the United States.  However, such negotiations have
typically been protracted and involved costly inputs on the part of each
party.  This experience is observed more widely, for example in negotia-
tions between the European Union and United States over the equivalency
of veterinary controls.  These negotiations took many years to conclude
and, to date, have still to produce observable benefits in terms of trade in
animal products.
Two differing views of the WTO and NAFTA SPS Agreements are
common.  The first, held mostly by government (regulatory) officials and
those negotiating trade agreements and disputes, is that the Agreements
provide an excellent framework for resolving disputes and finding rap-
prochement solutions.  The second, held by the same type of officials in
developing countries, is that the Agreements provide a justification and
international defence for national standards (use of international standards,161
risk assessment, etc.) that is of little use to developing countries.  In much
of Africa, proprietary standards of food processors and European retailers
determine import requirements and not the internal standards of the EU or
the exporting countries.  Such market solutions, third party certification to
a private or proprietary standard, may be the way forward as the FTAA is
negotiated.
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